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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v, 
LARRY D. PERSON 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 930059-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the denial of a motion for 
modification of judgment following a conviction for theft, a 
third degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
(1990), in the Second Judicial District Court, in and for Weber 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Michael J. Glasmann, 
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Should this Court consider defendant's claiir of 
ineffective assistance of counsel when it was not claimed in his 
motion for modification of judgment? "[O]rdinarily, [the 
reviewing court] will not entertain an issue first raised on 
appeal in the absence of exceptional circumstances or plain 
error." State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987); State 
v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 580-81 (Utah App. 1992). 
2. Was the defendant denied effective assistance of counsel 
because his trial counsel did not independently confirm 
defendant's two prior theft convictions? "When . . . the claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time 
on appeal, [the appellate court] resolve[s] the issue as a matter 
of law." State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah 1994). In 
order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
a defendant must establish (1) that his counsel's performance 
"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness;" and (2) 
that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S. Ct. 
2052, 2064 (1984)) . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann- § 76-6-412 (1990) 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this 
chapter shall be punishable: 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the: 
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any 
robbery, or any burglary with intent to commit theft [.] 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Larry D. Person was charged by information with third degree 
felony theft in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404, -412 
(1990), for obtaining or exercising unauthorized control over the 
property of Mervyn's Store, "to wit: shoes of a value less than 
$250.00, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and because 
defendant had been twice previously convicted of any theft, 
robbery or burglary with intent to commit theft" (R. 1). 
Initially, defendant pled not guilty (R. 17). Pursuant to a 
plea agreement with the State, defendant changed his plea to 
guilty (R. 28-29, 31-37, 95-98) . The trial court sentenced 
2 
defendant t: a term of zero to five years in the Utah State 
Prison (R. •*!) . Thereafter, Defendant, pro se, filed a "Motion 
for Modification of Judgment" (hereinafter "motion," R. 44-46), 
which the trial court summarily denied as frivolous (R. 66), from 
which defendant appeals (R. 68). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
For this appeal, the pertinent facts involve: (1) the 
parties7 evident recognition of defendant's prior convictions, 
used to enhance the theft charcre to a third degree felony; and 
(2) the distinction between c.^ims raised in defendant's motion 
from those now raised on appeal. 
Preliminary to changing his plea, defendant signed a 
statement (see Statement of Defendant in Advance of Plea of 
Guilty, R. 31-37, attached at Addendum A). Defendant's statement 
indicated: (1) defendant discussed with his attorney the nature 
of the charge and understood the elements of the offense, i.e., a 
third degree felony theft based on two prior theft convictions 
(R. 31-32); (2) defendant r«ad and understood English (R. 34); 
(3) defendant understood that within thirty days he could request 
to withdraw his guilty plea (R. 35); and (4) that defendant had 
sufficiently discussed his case with his trial counsel, with whom 
he was satisfied (R. 3T). 
At the plea hearing defendant acknowledged that he 
understood the plea agreement and that everything had been 
disclosed to the court (R. 95). Specifically, the court 
confirmed that defendant understood English, that defendant had 
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been "twice previously convicted of theft, robbery or burglary 
with intent to commit theft," and that defendant was knowingly 
and voluntarily entering a guilty plea after having reviewed his 
written statement with his trial counsel (R. 96-99). The trial 
court also informed defendant that he could move to withdraw his 
plea within thirty days, but not later (R. 99). 
Nearly three months L:er, defendant filed his motion for 
modification (R. 44). The motion contained seven allegations of 
error, none of which pertained to ineffective assistance of 
counsel (R. 44-46) . Defendant appealed only from the denial of 
this motion (see Notice of Appeal, R. 68). At ~> time has 
defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Defendant appeals only from the denial of his motion for 
modification of judgment, whijh does not contain a challenge to 
the effectiveness of his counsel, the only claim raised on 
appeal. Because defendant has failed to preserve his claim, the 
Court should decline to consider it on appeal. 
POINT II 
Defendant fails to satisfy either prong of the Strickland 
test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel failed to independently 
verify his prior convictions and thereby incompetently 
recommended that he plead guilty to a third degree felony theft 
charge. However, the record is replete with defendant's 
4 
acknowledgment of his prior convictions. Therefore, counsel 
reasonably assumed the fact of the convictions in making his 
recommendation. Moreover, defendant has never denied the prior 
convictions, moved to withdraw his guilty plea or asserted that 
he would proceed to trial but for his trial counsel's alleged 
ineffectiveness. Therefore, defendant has failed to show that 
the outcome of the proceeding would have been different even if 
counsel had independently verified the convictions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE HIS CLAIM OF 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Defendant has failed to preserve :* s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel on appeal. 
11
 [0] rdinarily, [the reviewing court] will not entertain an 
issue first raised on appeal in the absence of exceptional 
circumstances or plain error." State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 
1311 (Utah 1987); State v. Pries., 837 P.2a 576, 580-81 (Utah App. 
1992) -1 
1
 An ineffective assistance may be raised on appeal "if the 
trial record is adequate to permit decision of the issue and 
defendant is represented by counsel ctner than trial counsel." 
State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1991). However, 
Humphries was a decision on certiorari to the Utah Supreme court 
involving a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 
Thus, the defendant had no intervening opportunity to make his 
claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. In this 
case, however, defendant had such an opportunity in the trial 
court, i.e., the filing -of his motion to modify the judgment. It 
must be assumed that defendant intended to raise in his motion 
all claims affecting his substantial rights, including 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Defendant nowhere 
suggests that circumstances prevented him from raising the 
5 
Both the notice of appeal (R. 68) and defendant's opening 
brief specifically challenge only the trial court's denial of his 
motion for modication of judgment. Appellant's Br. at 1, 2, 5, 
6, 10. More particularly, defendant challenges on appeal "only 
those points raised [in his motion] which bear upon of [sic] 
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, there being no other 
substantial arguments . . . ." Appellant's Br. at 8. 
Defendant's discussion of alleged ineffective assistance asserts 
only that his trial counsel failed to verify the accuracy of a 
"rap sheet" referencing defendant's prior convictions. 
Appellant's Br. at 9. 
Defendant's motion does not include a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel (R. 44-46).2 Therefore, defendant has 
failed to preserve his claim. Defendant does not assert that 
exceptional circumstances prevented him from raising an 
ineffectiveness claim. Neither does defendant allege that the 
trial court committed plain error in accepting his guilty plea 
without a further verification of conviction record other than 
ineffectiveness claim now urged on appeal in his motion. 
Therefore, the general directive regarding ineffectiveness claims 
announced in Humphries should not be applied to this case. 
2
 Defendant claims that his motion raised the 
ineffectiveness of his counsel in failing to explain the charge 
and possible sentence arid that the prior convictions were not 
proven in court. Appellant's Br. at 7. In fact, defendant made 
clear in his memorandum in support of his motion that his 
challenge concerning prior convictions related only to whether he 
was represented by counsel in those prior proceedings (R. 63-64), 
and that he was not claiming ineffective assistance of counsel as 
to any issue (R. 49-65) . 
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the rap sheet.3 Finally*, because defendant has never moved to 
withdraw his guilty plea, he is jurisdictionally barred from now 
raising such motion. Price, 837 P.2d at 581-84. For all these 
reasons this Court should not consider defendant's claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. However, even considering 
defendant's claim, a cursory review shows it to be without merit. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW THAT HIS TRIAL 
COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE WAS DEFICIENT OR THAT, 
BUT FOR COUNSEL'S ALLEGED ERRORS, THE RESULT 
WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT 
In State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), the Utah 
Supreme Court adopted the two-part test set out in Strickland v. 
Washington 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), in evaluating a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant must 
3
 In State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), the supreme 
court identified the necessary showing to establish plain error: 
In general, to establish the existence 
of plain error and to obtain appellee relief 
from an alleged error that was not properly 
objected to, the appellant must show the 
following: (i) An error exists; (ii) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., 
absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for 
the appellant, or phrased differently, our 
confidence in the verdict is undermined. . . 
• If any one of these requirements is not 
met, plain error is not established. 
Id. at 1208-09 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Given defendant's hedging assertion that the rap sheet may 
or may not have been accurate, it is obvious, at the very least, 
that defendant has failed to show prejudice, i.e., that the 
court's confidence in the verdict should be undermined. 
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first "identify the acts or omissions" which, under the 
circumstances, "show that counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 186. This 
requires a showing that counsel's errors were so serious that he 
was not functioning as "counsel" as guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment. Id. Secondly, the defendant "must show that there is 
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." Id. 186-87. The defendant has the 
burden of proof with respect to both prongs of the Strickland 
test. Id. at 186. Defendant has failed to carry the burden with 
respect to both of these parts. 
A. Trial Counsel's Acceptance of Defendant's 
Prior Convictions, Without Apparent 
Verification, was Reasonable. 
Defendant asserts that his trial counsel erred in not 
obtaining a certified transcript of his prior convictions. 
Consequently, defendant argues, trial counsel relied "solely on 
information furnished by the prosecutor" regarding defendant's 
prior convictions. Therefore, defendant contends, his counsel 
erroneously recommended that he plead guilty to a third degree 
felony. Appellant's Br. at 9. However, defendant cites no 
authority for the proposition that counsel acted incompetently in 
relying on defendant's own admissions and a "rap sheet" when 
8 
recommending that he plead guilty.4 
Given record evidence that defendant was informed numerous 
times that he was being charged with a third degree felony based 
on his two previous theft convictions (R. 95, 104, 106), and the 
fact that he never challenged that point, trial counsel's 
reliance on the existence of the prior convictions was 
reasonable. And before accepting the guilty plea, the trial 
court informed defendant that the State would h&v to prove "that 
you have been twice previously convicted of any -reft.. . ." (R. 
97). Finally, defendant himself acknowledged in his statement 
that "I have been previously convicted twice of theft" (~ ..2) . 
In sum, trial counsel performed competently in allowing defendant 
to plead guilty. 
B. Defendant has Not Shown that the 
Result of the Proceeding Would Have Been 
Different had Counsel Obtained Certification 
of the Prior Convictions. 
The second prong of Strickland, i.e., that "there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's un; ^  Sessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," 
Strickland 466 U.S. at 694, applies to guilty pleas. K. _ /. 
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370-71 (1985). 
When counsel is allegedly ineffective in allowing a defendant to 
4
 Defendant does cite State v. Anderson, 797 P.2d 1114 
(Utah App. 1990), in which this Court reversed a trial court's 
determination that the defendant had twice previously £een 
convicted of theft. However, in Anderson the case went to trial, 
and the State attempted to prove Anderson's prior convictions 
based only on clerical notes. Id. at 1115. In this case 
however, defendant nowhere denies the prior convictions. 
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plead guilty, this prejudice prong is satisfied by proof that but 
for counsel's errors, the defendant would have insisted c^ 
proceeding to trial. Id. 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S. Ct. at 37^-31. 
Defendant nowhere shows that he was not actually twice convicted 
of burglary, theft or robbery. Therefore, he has not shown 
either that he wc^„d not have pleaded guilty to third degree 
felony theft and proceeded to trial, or that the outcome of trial 
would have been different had trial counsel sought certified 
copies of prior convictions. Therefore, defendant cannot succeed 
on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests th^s Court 
affirm the denial of the defendant's motion to modify judgment 
and deny his appellate claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness. 
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED 
In accordance with procedures concerning oral argument and 
the issuance of opinions, effective January 1, 1995, the State 
does not request oral argument based on this Court's prior 
development of the issues raised in this case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this X^ day of July, 1995. 
Jan Graham 
Attorney General 
y^ Kenneth A. Bronston 
Assistant Attorney General 
10 
CERTIFICA"" OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Stephen A. Laker, Attorney for Appellant, 2568 Washington Blvd., 
St 202, Ogden, Utah 84401, this 7? day of July, 2995. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Statement of Defendant in Advance of Pleas of Guilty 
p. '? ° l' 
PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, INC., ^ C o ! - ="' 0 CO 
OF WEBER COUNTY 
2568 Washington Blvd., Suite 203 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: (801) 392-8247 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SFCOVD JUPICIAL DISTRICT 
WEBER COUNTY, S^Ali " l".._ 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
I Defendant• 
7
*fc 
STATEMENT C~ ^VDANT IN 
ADVANCE OF PLEA OF GUILTY 
Case No. ^l(C(dOWl ^ S Judge i I L I y 
L\. 
I hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of 
the following facts and rights by my attorney, that I understand 
said facts and rights, and that I have had the assistance of 
counsel in reviewing, explaining and completing this form: 
1. The nature of the charges against me have bee - ^ plained. 
I have had an opportunity to discuss the nature of the cnarges with 
my attorney, and I understand the charges and the elements of each 
charge which the government is required to prove. 
2. As explained, I am charged with crimes in Weber County as 
follows: 
Class or 
Crimg P^gree Statutory Penalty 
7kft 3dQon up-^f/or 
P I P . cco*ft^ 
031 
STATE OF UTAH vs. 
Statement by Defendant in 
Advance of Plea of Guilty 
Criminal No. 
3. The possibility of entering a plea of guilty to the 
charges has been discussed with the prosecutor as follows: 
Class or 
crime Pegjreg Statutory penalty / 
4. I understand that the elements of the offenses I am 
pleading guilty to are:—--7 L I \ \ 
Jmt -4 -went vdcuu^Jjf *i> \ 
{O'^i w^ (jj ( T t W r Q & ^ 1 ^  4 A 0 T* ~r v\4 \M. 
lOortfv fvjfr^. 6-?^ ' ' - L ^ ^ ^ ^ 
5. I know that: I can be represented by an attorney at every 
stage of the proceeding, and I know that if I cannot afford an 
attorney, one will be appointed to represent me. 
6. I know that I have a right to plead "not guilty," and I 
know that if I do plead "not guilty," I can persist in that plea. 
7. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury, and that 
if I were to stand trial by a jury: 
a. I have a right to the assistance of counsel at every 
stage of the proceeding. 
b. I have a right to see and observe the witnesses who 
testify against me. 
03: 
STATE OF UTAH vs. 
Statement by Defendant in 
Advance of Plea of Guilty 
Criminal No, 
c. My attorney can cross-e* -nine all witnesses who 
testify against me. 
d. I can call sue: witnesses as I desire, and I can 
obtain subpoenas to require the attendance and testimony of 
those witnesses. If I cannot afford to pay ine witness and 
mileage fees of those witnesses, the government will pay them. 
e. I cannot be forced to incriminate myself and I do 
not have to testify at any trial. 
f. If I do not want to testify, the jury will be told 
that no inference adverse to me may be drawn from my failure 
to testify. 
g. The government must prove each and every element of 
the offenses charged against me beyond a reasonable doubt.-
h. A unanimous verdict of a jury is required to convict 
me. 
i. If I were to be convicted, I can appeal, and if I 
cannot affor the cost of such an appeal, the government will 
pay the cc. .3 of the appeal including the services cf 
appointed counsel. 
8. Under a plea of guilty, the^ vill not be a trial of any 
kind, and I am waiting my rights listed in the previous paragraph 
and admitting t - I am guilty of the crime to which my plea of 
guilty is entered. 
9. There is no appellate review of any lawful sentence 
imposed under a plea of guilty. 
10. No agreements have been reached and no representations 
have been made to me as to what the sentence will be. 
11. I know that under the laws of Utah, the possible maximum 
sentence that can and may be imposed upon my plea of guilty to the 
3 
033 
STATE OF UTAH vs. 
Statement by Defendant in 
Advance of Plea of Guilty 
Criminal No. 
charge identified on page two of this agreement, are set out in 
paragraph three above. I also know that if I am on probation, 
parole or awaiting sentencing upon another offense for which I have 
been convicted or plead guilty, my plea in the present action may 
result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
12. I know that under a plea of guilty, the judge may ask me 
questions about the offense to which the plea is entered. 
13. The only plea^ agreemeift which has been entered into with' 
the government is: ^ ) £ ] 7 ^ ^[[ {^ ^ W ( # 4 ~ S^^Udu 
r>v (A^ &**& \ AU^A (p\k*i , 
14. I have a rignt to asx rne Court any questions I wish to 
ask concerning my rights, or about these proceedings and the plea. 
* * * 
I make the following representations to the Court: 
1. I am 7 y years of age. My education consists of Z-•— 
years. /£ can/pannot read and understand English. 
2. JJo threats or promises of any sort have been made to me 
to induce me or to persuade me to enter this plea. 
3. No one has told me that I would receive probation or any 
other form of leniency because of my plea. 
031 
STATE OF UTAH vs. 
Statement by Defendant in 
Advance of Plea of Guilty 
Criminal No. 
4. I understand that I may request to withdraw a plea of 
guilty within 30 days of entry of the plea, but if said request is 
hot made within 30 days I forfeit this right. A motion to 
Withdraw a plea of guilty will only be granted upon good cause and 
is within the discretion of the Court. 
5. I have discussed this case and this plea with my lawyer 
fcs much as I wish to. 
6. I am satisfied with my lawyer. 
7. My decision to enter this plea was made after full and 
Careful thought, with t: e ad\_ce of counsel, and with a full 
Understanding of my rights, the facts and circumstances of the case 
and the consequences of the plea. I was not under the influence of 
any drugs, medication or intoxicants when tne decision to enter the 
plea was made and I am not now unqier the influence of any drugs, 
dedication or intoxicants. 
8. I have no mental reservations concerning the plea. 
DATED this 30^day of *&f% - , 1992. 
£^<I <T>^, 
035 
STATE OF UTAH vs. 
Statement by Defendant in 
Advance of Plea of Guilty 
Criminal No. 
I certify that I have discussed this statement with the 
Defendant; that I have fully explained her/his rights and believe 
that he/she is knowingly and voluntarily entering the plea with 
full knowledge of her/his legal rights and that there is a factual 
basis for the plea. 
DATED this j ? ^ dav of Sff , 1992./ 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
I certify that I have reviewed the Statement of the Defendant 
in Advance of Plea cf Guilty and that said statement correctly 
reflects the plea negotiations of the parties. 
DATED this 36 day of>JL-|e*^ 4v', 1992. 
(^v 
DEPUTY WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY 
03G 
STATE OF UTAH vs. 
Statement by Defendant in 
Advance of Plea of Guilty 
Criminal No. 
Q P P E P 
The signature of the Defendant was acknowledged in the 
presence of the undersigned Judge. 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement by 
Defendant in Advance of Plea of Guilty, the court finds the 
Defendant's plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made and it is 
ordered that Defendant's plea of "gui'-y" to the charge(s) set 
forth in tne agreement be accepted and entered. 
DONE in Court this day of , 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
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ADDENDUM B 
T r a n s c r i p t on Appeal 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR WEBEF ^UNTY 
THE STATE 0? UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
•\s-
LARRY D. PERSON, 
Defendant 
Case No. 921900449 
TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL 
BE IT REMEMBERED that the above er.t. rd matter came on 
for hearing before the Hon. MICHAEL J. GLASMANN, Judge of the 
above entitled Court on September 30, 19°2. 
WHEREUPON the following proceedings were and the 
following testimony was adduced, to wit: 
A p p e a r a n c e s : 
WILLIAM F. DAINES, ESQ. 
Attorney for Plaintiff; 
ROBERT L. FROERER, ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendant. 
FILED 
MAY 1 6 1995 
COURT OF APPEALS 
rso 
C O 
THE COURT: State of Utah vs. Larry D. Person, case 
0449. Time for Pre-Trial, and our trial having been set for 
October the 9th. 
MR. FROERER: Your Honor, we have a negotiated 
settlement of this matter. Mr. Person is going to plead 
guilty to the charge. The State, through Mr. Decaria, is 
going to make no sentencing recommendation, though he does 
reserve the right to comment on Mr. Person's prior record. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. FROERER: That's it. 
THE COURT: Is that the State's understanding? 
MR. DAINES: That's correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Person, you have heard that 
representation, that you are going to plead guilty as charged 
to the third degree felony, theft. That the State agrees to 
make no recommendation as to what your sentence should be, but) 
does reserve the right to comment on your previous criminal 
record if they so choose. You understand that that is the 
plea bargain? 
MR. PERSON: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: Is there anything else that's been 
represented to you that has not been disclosed here? 
MR. PERSON; No. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you have a clear mind 
today? 
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MR. PERSON: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: Are you under the influence of any 
alcohol or drugs? 
MR. PERSON: No. 
THE COURT: A: you under the influence of any 
medication that would cloud your thinking? 
MR. PERSON: No. 
THE COURT: Do you speak, read and write the Englisfcj 
language? 
MR. PERSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: You understand that you are entitled to 
a trial on this third degree felony, and that could be to a 
Judge or to a Jury. If the trial were to a Jury it would be 
an eight member Jury. And before you could be convicted, each) 
member of the Jury would have to be satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt of your guilt. You understand that? 
MR. PERSON; Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that you have the 
right to confront the witnesses the State would call against 
you, including cross-examination of those witnesses. That you| 
have the right to compel witnesses to come here to court and 
testify on your behalf? 
MR. PERSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that if you plead 
guilty, and do not have a trial, you will be giving up your 
3 
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right to appeal from anything that might have occurred during 
that trial? 
MR. PERSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: In this case you are presumed innocent. 
The State has the burden of proving your guilty, as I have 
said, beyond a reasonable doubt. The State has alleged, and 
must prove in this case, that you committed a theft. That yovj 
obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property 
of Mervynfs Shoes, to wit, shoes, of a value less than $250.00) 
with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof. And that you 
have been twice previously convicted of any theft, robbery ;or 
burglary with intent to commit theft. 
Is that correct, Mr. Daines? 
MR. DAINES: Yes, thatfs correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that those are the 
elements the State would have to prove against you? 
MR. PERSON: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty in this case 
because you in fact committed the theft? 
MR. PERSON: Yes, I am. 
THE COURT: Tell the Court what happened briefly if 
you would. 
MR. PERSON: Well, I walked in and put on a pair of 
shoes and walked out. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you understand that the 
4 
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maximum penalty for the third degree felony is zero to five 
years in the Utah State Prison and up to $5,000.00 in fines? 
MR. PERSON: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: You understand that nc^withstanding 
whatfs been said or represented to you, that it is up to the 
Court to sentence you. And the Court can sentence you to the 
maximum penalty? 
MR. PERSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. At this time do you need any morej 
time to think about this, or to consult with your attorney? 
MR. PERSON; No, I donft. 
THE COURT: As to the third degree felony, theft, 
alleged to have been committed on May 17, 1992, how do you 
plead? 
MR. PERSON: Guilty. 
MR. FROERER: I do have a statement, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Pardon? 
MR. FROERER: We do have e latement. 
THE COURT: Very good. Ii you will approach the 
Bench, Mr. Froerer. 
Your attorney, Mr. Person, has provided roe with a 
Statement of Defendant in Advance of Plea of Guilty. Has your] 
attorney been over that with you? 
MR. PERSON: Yes, he has. 
THE COURT: He explained i t t o you? 
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MR. PERSON: Yes, he did. 
THE COURT: It appears to contain the signature of 
Larry Person. Is that your signature on page five? 
MR. PERSON; Yes, it is. 
THE COURT: All right. The Court will find that yovj 
knowingly and voluntarily entered your plea of guilty. 
I want to advise you, as I have previous Defendants, that) 
you have 30 days from today within which to bring a Motion to 
Withdraw your Plea of Guilty. It doesnft mean the Court will 
grant it, but if you don't bring it within that 30 days, it is| 
not timely. Do you understand that? 
MR. PERSON: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: All right. This matter needs to be set 
for sentencing. The Probation Office looking for three weeks?) 
PROBATION OFFICER: Yes, your Honor. 
MR. FROERER: Your Honor, he is requesting sooner 
than that. 
THE COURT: Let me ask this question: Do we have 
any—have you ever been on probation before this Court 
previous to this? 
MR. PERSON: Yes, I have. 
THE COURT: How long ago? 
MR. PERSON: Quite a while ago. I have been on 
parole, though. 
MR. DAINES: Thatfs what partially complicates this 
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situation. Mr. Funk informs me in many instances it is 
actually going to take longer to do a probation report on a 
person with his type of record than it might a person without 
a record. 
THE COURT: Mr. Person, I recommend that we give theitj 
time to do a full report. That could be to your benefit for 
the Court to have a full report of your background. 
So we will set sentencing for the 21st of October. And 
that will be at 2:00 p.m. 
I will indicate to you that *v <-^->~ take into 
account the time that you have served at tne time of sentence. 
MR. PERSON: Thank you. 
MR. FROERER: Thank you. 
100 
